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INTRODUCTION
“I have two words to leave you with tonight, ladies and gentleman:
inclusion rider,” said actress Frances McDormand at the conclusion of her
acceptance speech for the best actress Oscar during the March 4, 2018,
Academy Awards.1 McDormand later explained that “You can ask for and/or
demand at least 50 percent diversity in not only the casting but also the crew,”

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Operations, Elisabeth
Haub School of Law at Pace University. J.D., 2002, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1999, Yale
University. Warmest thanks to the editors of the Belmont Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this symposium.
1. Carol Buckley & Daniel Victor, What Did Frances McDormand Mean by an
“Inclusion Rider” at the Oscars?, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2
018/03/05/movies/inclusion-rider-frances-mcdormand-oscars.html.
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noting that she had “just learned” about that idea “after 35 years of being in
the film business.”2
McDormand was specifically drawing on the work of Professor
Stacy Smith, a University of Southern California communications professor
who coined the “inclusion rider” concept and term several years ago to
address the lack of diversity within Hollywood.3 Although the inclusion rider
need not involve a demand for 50 percent diversity, the basic concept was for
prominent actors and actresses to insist upon, as riders to their individual
contracts, a certain level of diversity among the cast and crew.4 Professor
Smith first introduced the idea in a Hollywood Reporter op-ed in 20145 and
delivered a widely-watched TED Talk about it in 2016.6 At the inaugural
Bloomberg Business of Equality Summit in May of 2018, she explained:
[I was] sitting in my office one day, and I was thinking about
contracts . . . and I thought to myself, if an A-lister simply
does one thing, we could change the epidemic of invisibility,
and the lack of females being on-screen, in seven years. All
A-listers would have to do is leverage their power and put a
clause in their contract that stipulates that equality must be
part of the process. And that’s what we did. It’s been adopted
by Michael B. Jordan, Brie Larsen, Matt Damon, Ben
Affleck, and most importantly, William Morris Endeavors
Talent Agency . . . .7
The Annenberg Inclusion Initiative at USC, a think tank led by
Professor Smith, now offers a sample “inclusion rider template” on its
2. Abigail Hess, Oscar Winner Frances McDormand Encourages Actors to Push for
“Inclusion Riders”—Here’s What That Means, CNBC (March 5, 2018), https://www.cnbc.
com/2018/03/05/frances-mcdormand-encourages-actors-to-push-for-inclusion-riders.html.
3. Omar Yousif, Professor Coined Term Inclusion Rider, DAILY TROJAN (March 6,
2018), https://dailytrojan.com/2018/03/06/professor-coined-term-inclusion-rider/.
4. Stacy Smith, Hey, Hollywood: It’s Time to Adopt the NFL’s Rooney Rule—For
Women, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/heyhollywood-time-adopt-nfls-754659. The “Rooney Rule” is an NFL policy stating that all
teams must interview at least one minority for head coach and other senior positions. See, e.g.,
Kenneth Johnson, What Corporations Can Learn About Diversity from the NFL’s Rooney
Rule, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescoachescouncil/2018/02/01
/what-corporations-can-learn-about-diversity-from-the-nfls-rooney-rule/#78c6e2e747de;
Harry Lyles, Jr., The NFL’s Rooney Rule Won’t Solve Tech’s Diversity Problem, THE VERGE
(June 5, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/5/17424992/facebook-amazon-diversityhiring-rooney-rule.
5. Smith, supra note 4.
6. Stacy Smith, The Data Behind Hollywood’s Sexism, TED (Oct. 2016),
https://www.ted.com/talks/stacy_smith_the_data_behind_hollywood_s_sexism/transcript?la
nguage=en.
7. Stacey Smith, What is the Inclusion Rider Initiative, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2018-05-09/what-is-the-inclusion-rider-initiativevideo.
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website.8 The template sets forth casting and hiring objectives for both
supporting roles (“Wherever possible, the Director and Casting Director will
select qualified members of under-represented groups for supporting roles in
a manner that matches the expected demographics of the film’s setting”)9 and
off-screen positions (“The producer or studio shall make all reasonable
efforts to fill those positions with qualified and available individuals who
have been under-represented in that position”).10 Additionally, the sample
rider includes a compliance mechanism, whereby a quantitative analysis is
performed to measure whether the targets were met; if not, the studio is
required to make a charitable contribution.11
The “inclusion rider” concept dovetails with a growing trend in
corporate America, in which several major corporations have begun
requiring their outside law firms to meet numerical diversity targets in
working on their specific matters. In 2017, Facebook announced that it
would require “women and ethnic minorities [to] account for at least 33
percent of law firm teams working on its matters.”12 That same year, Hewlett
Packard (“HP”) similarly set forth a numerical minimum for how many
female and ethnically diverse attorneys must work on their matters, warning
law firms that it would “withhold up to 10 [percent] of all amounts invoiced
by law firms that d[id] not meet or exceed [its] minimal diverse staffing
requirements.”13 Other corporations, such as MetLife, Microsoft, and Shell,
have taken similar action.14 Even prior to these developments, the NFL had
8. Kalpana Kotagel, at al., Inclusion Rider Template, USC ANNENBERG (March 2018),
http://assets.uscannenberg.org.s3.amazonaws.com/docs/inclusion-rider-template.pdf.
9. Id. at ¶4.a.ii.
10. Id. at ¶4.b.
11. Id. at ¶8.
12. Ellen Rosen, Facebook Pushes Outside Law Firms on Diversity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/02/business/dealbook/facebook-pushes-outsidelaw-firms-to-become-more-diverse.html.
13. Letter from Kim M. Rivera, HP Chief Legal Officer, to Law Firm Partners (Feb. 8,
2017), (instructing all U.S.-based law firms with at least 10 attorneys that, “[i]n order to
comply with the requirement, firms must field (i) at least one diverse Firm relationship partner,
regularly engaged with HP on billing and staffing issues; or (ii) at least one woman and one
racially/ethnically diverse attorney, each performing or managing at least 10% of the billable
hours worked on HP matters”), https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judi
cialstudies/panel_-5-hp_diversity_mandate_to_partner_law-firms_.pdf (last visited Dec. 12,
2018).
14. See Mary Flood, Shell Lawyer: There’s More to Diversity Than Lip Service, HOUS.
CHRON. (May 13, 2007), https://www.chron.com/business/article/Shell-lawyer-There-s-moreto-diversity-than-lip-1800430.php (describing the push by Shell’s general counsel to “insist[]
on diversity and inclusiveness in her workplace and the places she hired,” such as requiring
Shell’s law firms “to account . . . for how many female and minority lawyers work on Shell
business, for how many hours they work and what they do”); Brad Smith, Announcing the
Next Generation of Microsoft’s Law Firm Diversity Program: Working Towards a More
Diverse and Inclusive Legal Profession, MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2015/08/04/announcing-the-next-generation-ofmicrosofts-law-firm-diversity-program-working-towards-a-more-diverse-and-inclusivelegal-profession/ [https://perma.cc/4HQQ-F6KF] (describing bonus structure of up to two
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adopted the related “Rooney Rule” in 2003, which requires football teams to
interview at least one person of color for head coaching and high-level
executive positions and, as of 2016, also interview at least one woman for
executive positions.15 However, the Rooney Rule differs from the more
recent policies, in that it does not set goals for the ultimate outcome and only
covers the interviewing process.16
These overlapping and converging movements have the worthy and
important goals of promoting equal employment opportunity and addressing
the under-representation of women and ethnic minorities in a variety of
workplace settings. But their co-existence with Title VII’s prohibition of
differential treatment of employees based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin17 is unclear. For example, if a law firm replaces a male
attorney with a female attorney on a client team in direct response to a client’s
threat to withhold full payment unless the team has a certain percentage of
women, could that male attorney have a successful Title VII claim?
Similarly, if a Hollywood studio complies with an A-list actor’s inclusion
rider by only considering “individuals who have been under-represented” for,
say, a production manager position, is there a viable Title VII claim for
rejected job applicants who are of non-under-represented ethnicities?
Unsurprisingly, the very day after Frances McDormand’s “inclusion
rider” speech at the Academy Awards, the California office of a leading
employment law firm, Proskauer Rose, issued a brief memo to provide a
cautionary note to its clients. Proskauer emphasized that “although an actor
may request that good faith efforts be undertaken to hire a diverse crew,
demanding that certain race or gender quotas be met could run afoul of Title
VII.”18 The update concluded that employers “should be wary of agreeing to
riders demanding that specific quotas be met.”19
In this piece, I situate these sorts of diversity requests within the
broader context of other customer/client preferences that implicate Title VII.
To be sure, the “inclusion riders” are not literal customer/client requests, but
rather requests from celebrities who are themselves being hired by the
employer for a specific project. Broadly speaking, however, they raise the

percent of the legal fees billed to the company “based on their performance in increasing
diversity in three aspects of a firm’s leadership. . . . (1) leading the management of the law
firm; (2) leading the law firm’s relationship with Microsoft; and (3) leading work on
Microsoft’s legal matters”); Casey Sullivan, Deadline for Diversity Issued by Top MetLife
Lawyer, BIG L. BUS. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://biglawbusiness.com/deadline-for-diversity-issuedby-top-metlife-lawyer/.
15. See Lyles, Jr., supra note 4.
16. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
18. Tony Oncidi & Pietro Deserio, “Inclusion Riders” On the Storm, PROSKAUER CAL.
EMP. L. UPDATE (Mar. 5, 2018), https://calemploymentlawupdate.proskauer.com/2018/03/in
clusion-riders-on-the-storm/.
19. Id.
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same legal issue regarding third-party preferences that implicate protected
characteristics under Title VII.
As a starting point, the general rule within employment
discrimination law is that customer preferences cannot justify discriminatory
treatment by employers.20 That baseline has led courts to rule that employers
cannot, for instance, hire only female flight attendants on grounds that people
prefer to be served by women,21 or accommodate racist customers’ requests
for white employees.22 However, there are certain openings within federal
employment discrimination law for some customer/client preferences, in
some situations, to provide successful defenses to what would otherwise
likely be actionable discrimination. In a recent article, I provided a taxonomy
of those preferences, which I deem the “preferred preferences.”23 Such
preferences include (1) aesthetic appeal; (2) physical privacy from
employees of the opposite sex; (3) psychological comfort/affinity with
employees of the same sex; (4) an English-speaking environment; (5) the
desire not to be proselytized to/feel judged; and (6) convenience.24 As I noted
there, an open question is whether diversity itself may become a seventh
preferred preference to which courts will defer.
This piece addresses that specific question. First, I describe the
broader context of “preferred preferences” within Title VII. Second, I
explore how the diversity preference does—and does not—fit into that
landscape, and how it connects up with affirmative action doctrine. I
conclude with some suggestions about the best ways for employers to
respond to the growing diversity preference.
I.

THE BROADER CONTEXT: “PREFERRED PREFERENCES” WITHIN
TITLE VII

There are four key openings within Title VII for customer
preferences to provide employer defenses to what would otherwise likely be
actionable discrimination. Three of them come from Title VII’s text itself,
and the fourth is a judicially-created doctrine.
A.

The BFOQ Defense

First, although Title VII prohibits disparate treatment on the basis of
an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, it includes a bona
fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) defense for three of those
20. Sparenberg v. Eagle All., No. JFM-14-1667, 2015 WL 6122809, at *6 (D. Md. Oct.
15, 2015).
21. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson
v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
22. See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010).
23. Emily Gold Waldman, The Preferred Preferences in Employment Discrimination
Law, 97 N.C. L. REV. 91, 95 (2019).
24. Id.
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characteristics: sex, religion, or national origin.25 Specifically, Title VII
provides that disparate treatment on the basis of religion, sex, or national
origin is permissible “in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”26
Can customer preferences for an employee of a particular religion,
sex, or national origin give rise to a BFOQ? Usually, the answer is no.27
However, in a narrow exception, courts have ruled that when the request
stems from a customer preference for physical privacy from employees of
the opposite sex28—or, occasionally, from a preference for the psychological
comfort that accompanies being with an employee of the same sex29—a valid
BFOQ can be created. The customer preference for convenience can also
play a supporting role here, because sometimes the only way to accommodate
customers’ physical privacy preferences without significantly
inconveniencing them is to hire employees of a particular sex for the job. For
example, a Tennessee district court ruled in favor of the Transportation
Security Agency’s argument that female sex was a BFOQ for an open airport
screener position because the TSA needed to have a certain number of female
screeners to be able to perform same-gender pat downs in a reasonable time
frame.30
Thus, the BFOQ defense provides one important customer
preference opening, through which customers’ physical privacy,
psychological comfort, and convenience preferences can sometimes enter to
create a successful employer defense.
B.

The “Job-Related and Consistent with Business Necessity”
Defense

The second customer preference opening within Title VII arises in
the context of disparate impact claims. In addition to prohibiting disparate
treatment on the basis of the aforementioned characteristics, Title VII also
prohibits facially-neutral policies that have a disparate impact as to those

25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).
26. Id.
27. See Chaney, 612 F.3d at 913; Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,
389 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
28. See, e.g., Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1423 (N.D. Ill.
1984); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80-1374-W, 1982 WL 3108, at *5 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 2, 1982); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195–96 (E.D. Ark. 1981),
vacated, 671 F.2d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d, 591 F.2d 1334 (1979).
29. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1996).
30. Wade v. Napolitano, No. 3–07–0892, 2009 WL 9071049, at * 2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar.
24, 2009) (deferring to TSA’s determination “that no less than 33% of screeners needed to be
women to ensure the availability of same gender-searches without compromising security or
significantly increasing wait times at checkpoints”) (emphasis added).
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characteristics.31 But Title VII also provides a defense: the employer can
continue to use that policy if it can show that the practice is “job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity,” and that an
alternative practice would not suffice.32 Thus, here, the question is whether
employers can make out the business necessity showing by arguing that the
facially-neutral policy responds to a strong customer preference.
Two customer preferences have come up in this context: aesthetic
appeal and an English-speaking environment. With regard to aesthetic
appeal, plaintiff employees have had mixed success in challenging faciallyneutral appearance policies that have an alleged disparate impact on race.33
Similarly, customers’ expressed or assumed preferences for employees to
speak English in their presence have also been held to satisfy the business
necessity defense.34 Specifically, several courts have held that employers are
justified in fearing that if customers overhear employees conversing with
each other in another language, they will find those employees less
approachable and may even think that the employees are mocking them.35
That said, courts are not as tolerant of policies that require employees to
speak English at all times, as opposed to only when they can be overheard by
customers.36
C.

The “Undue Hardship” Defense

The third customer preference opening in Title VII’s text arises in
connection with religious accommodation claims. Title VII recognizes, as a
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012).
32. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
33. Compare Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993) (ruling
in favor of African-American employee who challenged no-beard rule on grounds that it had
a disparate impact on African-American man, who were more likely to have a medical
condition that made shaving unhealthy), with EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d
1018, 1035 (11th Cir. 2016) (ruling against African-American female employee who
challenged no-dreadlocks rules), and Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256,
259, 265–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ruling against African-American male employee who
challenged employer’s requirement that employees wear a hat over their dreadlocks, or other
“unbusinesslike” hairstyles). Note that in the latter cases, the plaintiff employee did not fully
flesh out the disparate impact argument, so the courts did not explicitly address whether the
assumed customer preferences that gave rise to these rules could rise to the level of business
necessity.
34. See, e.g., Pacheco v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 599, 614, 621-22
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
35. See, e.g., Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 614, 621-22; Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 41617.
36. See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556-57 (N.D.
Tex. 1999) (striking down blanket “English-only” rule and noting the distinction between rules
that apply to all times and places and those that are more limited). EEOC regulations also
differentiate between rules that require “employees to speak only English at all times in the
workplace,” which are viewed as presumptively violating Title VII, and English-only rules
that are applied “only at certain times,” which can be permissible if “justified by business
necessity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)–(b).
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form of religious discrimination, the failure to accommodate an employee’s
religious observance or practice—unless the “employer demonstrates that he
is unable to reasonably accommodate [the] religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”37 This,
too, provides a potential opening: if the employer can show that the
accommodation will upset or offend customers, then the employer may be
able to argue that the accommodation is not reasonable and/or would impose
an undue hardship.
Three customer preferences have sometimes been able to enter this
opening: (1) aesthetic appeal; (2) the desire not to feel proselytized to or
judged; and (3) convenience. The aesthetic appeal preference appears in this
opening when employers have appearance-related rules (most commonly
relating to headcoverings, body-piercings, and beards) that conflict with
employees’ religious practice, and the employers argue that exempting
religious employees from those rules would turn off customers.38 The nonproselytization/judgment preference appears when employees seek to convey
religious messages to customers39 or to refuse to perform certain aspects of
the job for religious reasons.40 Here, employers argue that the likely
customer offense renders the accommodation unreasonable and/or likely to
impose an undue hardship.41 Finally, the convenience preference appears as
a supporting preference when religious employees seek to opt out of certain
aspects of the job, and the requested accommodation would inconvenience
customers by making them find another employee to serve them.42
D.

The “Equal Burdens” Doctrine

The final customer preference opening appears not in the actual text
of Title VII, but from a judicially-created doctrine for interpreting Title VII’s
ban on disparate treatment based on sex. This doctrine, known as the “equal
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); § 2000e(j).
38. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128 (1st Cir. 2004)
(upholding Costco’s no-body-piercing rule in the face of a challenge from a religious
employee who said that her membership in the Church of Body Modification required her to
display her piercing, on grounds that Costco had made out the undue hardship defense).
39. See, e.g., Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics, Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2001)
(ruling in favor of employer that would not allow religious employee to say “Have a blessed
day” to customers).
40. See, e.g., Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 2001)
(ruling in favor of employer that would not allow religious employee to refuse to counsel gay
clients about their romantic relationships).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, 232 F. App’x 581, 582 (7th Cir. 2007)
(ruling against a pharmacist who was terminated after he placed customers on indefinite holds
when they sought to fill birth control prescriptions, because the accommodation he
requested—refusing to interact in any way with customers seeking birth control—imposed an
undue hardship given that the only alternatives were keeping customers waiting or forcing
other employees to assume a disproportionate workload).
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burdens” standard, provides that gender-differentiated appearance
requirements for male and female employees do not violate Title VII unless
the requirements impose unequal burdens on men and women.43 Typically,
these appearance requirements—which require employees to conform with
traditional gender stereotypes about how males and females should appear,
such as by requiring female employees to have long hair and wear makeup—stem from customers’ expressed or assumed aesthetic appeal
preferences.44 Courts have tended to apply this “equal burdens” test
remarkably loosely, deferring even to those preferences that are quite
obviously more burdensome on women than men.45
Thus, this doctrine—like the “job-related and consistent with
business necessity” and “undue hardship” defenses—provides another
opening through which customer preferences for aesthetic appeal can justify
certain forms of discriminatory treatment.
E.

Reflections on the Broader Context

In sum, Title VII’s four customer preference openings have given
rise so far to six “preferred preferences,” as noted above: (1) aesthetic appeal;
(2) physical privacy from employees of the opposite sex; (3) psychological
comfort/affinity with employees of the same sex; (4) an English-speaking
environment; (5) the desire not to be proselytized to/feel judged; and (6)
convenience. To be sure, courts do not always defer to these preferences.46
But each of these six preferences has, at least occasionally, provided the basis
for a successful employer defense to a Title VII discrimination claim.47 As I
have written elsewhere, the strongly preferred preferences (i.e., the ones to
which courts frequently defer) are physical privacy from the opposite sex, an
English-speaking environment, and the desire not to be proselytized to or feel
judged; the moderately preferred preferences (the ones to which courts
sometimes defer) are aesthetic appeal and convenience; and the weakly
preferred preference (the one to which courts only occasionally defer) is
psychological comfort with the same sex.48
Although the preferred preferences are substantively very different,
they share some common threads. They seem to intuitively strike courts as
reasonable and natural—likely because the preferences do not immediately
seem invidiously discriminatory and are aligned with ingrained social
43. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) (“An
appearance standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women
is not disparate treatment.”).
44. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 1985).
45. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006).
46. Waldman, supra note 23, at 125 (“Judicial deference to the preference . . . varies
according to the extent to which they find the above factors satisfied.”).
47. See id. at 125–51 (listing examples of a successful employer defense case for each
of the six preferences).
48. Id. at 125.
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conventions and norms. Because the preferences seem so “normal,” courts
tend to consider them weightier than “mere preferences” and/or view
compliance with them as not particularly burdensome for employees. The
more that these two factors are satisfied in a particular case, the more
preference deference we see.49
Viewing the diversity preference expressed in inclusion riders within
the broader landscape of other preferred preferences sheds light on how
courts would—and should—treat it. On the one hand, the above discussion
shows that if courts were to show some deference to the diversity preference
would not be entirely anomalous. After all, there are already other customer
preferences to which courts defer in the face of Title VII challenges, and
some of them are much less consistent with Title VII’s antidiscrimination
mandate.
On the other hand, the above analysis also reveals some important
differences between the diversity preference and the other preferences. First,
there is no clear statutory or judicially-created opening within Title VII that
the diversity preference fits into. Moreover, the diversity preference overtly
challenges the status quo, as opposed to the existing preferred preferences,
which all reinforce the status quo. In the next section, I explore this tension,
and also touch on the limited applicability of affirmative action doctrine in
this area of law.
II.

WHERE DOES THE DIVERSITY PREFERENCE FIT IN?

As described above, certain customer preferences can sometimes
provide successful employer defenses to what would otherwise likely be
actionable discrimination. Moreover, some of the preferred preferences—
particularly the aesthetic appeal and English-speaking environment
preferences—fall especially hard on women and minorities. These two
preferences often reinforce majority default norms about genderpresentation, religion, and language, and burden those who deviate from
those norms in some way.50
In that sense, the diversity preference feels like a bracing fresh of
breath air: a preference that actually benefits those who have historically been
disfavored—i.e., the same types of employees who tend to get harmed by
some of the other customer preferences. Indeed, the diversity preference
seems more consistent with the underlying purpose of Title VII than do some
of the already-preferred preferences within the Title VII landscape. But it
still faces doctrinal challenges.

49. Id. at 96.
50. Id. at 158; see also Jesperson, 444 F.3d at 1110–13.
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The Existing Diversity Preference Openings: An Awkward Fit

Can the diversity preference be neatly slotted into any of the existing
customer preference openings within Title VII? Not easily. The religionspecific “undue hardship” opening is clearly inapplicable here, since these
preferences are not about religion. The “job-related and consistent with
business necessity” opening, while perhaps initially tempting, does not work
because that defense only applies in the context of disparate impact claims.51
Overtly taking an employee’s gender or ethnicity into account in order to
respond to a customer’s diversity preference amounts to disparate treatment,
not disparate impact.
That leaves us with the remaining two customer preference
openings: the statutory BFOQ defense and the judicially-created “equal
burdens” doctrine (whereby gender-differentiated appearance codes are not
seen as amounting to disparate treatment unless they are unequally
burdensome).
The BFOQ defense is unlikely to work. By its very terms, it does
not cover race or color—just sex, religion, and national origin. Additionally,
the only situation in which customer preferences have given rise to a
successful BFOQ is when some sort of privacy interest (typically a physical
privacy interest) is at stake.52 That is inapplicable to the types of diversity
preferences expressed in the inclusion riders or corporate policies described
above. Those preferences are not being expressed in the context of situations
where a customer will be seen nude or will even converse about emotionally
intimate topics with an employee. Rather, the above-described policies relate
to the formation of diverse teams of employees in contexts that are not
particularly private.
The “equal burdens” defense has more potential. First, since this
doctrine is judicially-created, judges could theoretically choose to expand it
beyond the narrow context of gender-differentiated appearance codes where
it is currently applied. Additionally, the spirit of the “equal burdens”
doctrine—that sometimes, differential treatment is acceptable, as long as the
overall result is not unequally burdensome53—is somewhat applicable here.
The above-described corporate policies all establish quantitative
requirements that leave room for men (and non-minorities) to still hold the
majority of positions, so it would be hard for them to argue that they are being
unequally burdened.54 Similarly, the inclusion rider template developed by
Professor Smith and her associates is largely focused on increasing the
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
52. Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OB-GYN: A Proposal for Expansion
of the Privacy BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 357, 372–88 (2004)
(discussing privacy BFOQs created by several lower courts).
53. See, e.g., Viscecchia v. Alrose Allegria LLC, 117 F. Supp. 3d 243, 250–53 (2015)
(summarizing the case law in this area).
54. See supra text accompanying note 12–14.
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proportion of under-represented groups, not on giving such groups a
disproportionate advantage.
That said, I am not at all confident that courts would, of their own
accord, undertake what would obviously be a sizeable expansion of the
“equal burdens” doctrine. As noted above, right now the doctrine only
applies to the narrow context of gender-differentiated appearance codes, not
to other forms of gender-differentiated treatment, let alone to explicitlydifferentiated treatment based on characteristics other than gender (namely,
race and ethnicity).55
Moreover, such an expansion—i.e., basically giving employers free
rein to respond to the diversity preference, as long as the overall quantitative
requirements do not disproportionately burden any particular group—would
involve a very different approach to customer preferences than the one courts
have historically followed. As noted above, the customer preferences that
receive the most deference tend to be the ones that align with ingrained social
conventions and norms, to the point that they seem reasonable, natural, and
even near-invisible at times.56 The diversity preference, in trying to change
rather than reinforce the default, is much more visible and blatant. That does
not mean that it is necessarily suspect or wrongheaded—quite the contrary.
But it does mean that it is less likely to fly under the radar and more likely to
trigger close analysis.
B.

What About Affirmative Action Doctrine?

It is also worth considering whether employers can invoke
affirmative action doctrine to justify their satisfaction of third parties’
diversity preferences. Here, too, there are major wrinkles. The Supreme
Court’s (scant) discussion in the Title VII context has indeed indicated that
there is some room for employers to engage in voluntary affirmative action
programs “designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories.”57 However, there are several key
differences between a traditional affirmative action program and an
employer’s decision to take sex or ethnicity into account in response to
specific diversity requests by customers, clients, or A-list celebrities.
First, in all of the cases where an affirmative action program was
upheld (whether under Title VII or, in the case of public universities, the
Equal Protection Clause), the defendant entity had a general affirmative
action policy that it had itself developed and implemented and was now
standing behind.58 That is very different from a situation in which the
55. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000)
(discussing the doctrine of unequal burdens and gender appearance codes).
56. Waldman, supra note 23, at 125.
57. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
58. See, e.g., id.; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 313 (2003).
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employer lacks a comprehensive policy and merely engages in diverse
staffing to the extent that a particular customer, client, or celebrity demands
it.
Second, and relatedly, the reasons for a particular customer, client,
or celebrity to demand such diversity are typically multi-faceted and
expressed in broad, almost tautological terms. For example, Facebook’s
general counsel justified its diversity policy simply by stating that “we want
to see [our law firms] win our cases and create opportunities for women and
people of color.”59 Similarly, HP’s Chief Legal Officer stated that “Our
vision at HP is to create technology that makes the world a better place for
everyone, everywhere. To achieve that vision, business leaders must
represent the diversity of our customers and stakeholders.”60 The inclusion
rider template similarly states, in its statement of purpose, that “increasing
the number of females—particularly recognizing the intersectional
discrimination faced by females of color—and individuals from other underrepresented groups . . . will facilitate employment and create a stronger
pipeline for diverse representation on screen.”61 Indeed, the benchmark for
meeting the diversity goal in connection with the casting of supporting roles
is not the relevant labor market of employees, but rather “the expected
demographics of the film’s setting.”62
These broad rationales differ from the traditional, remedial, Supreme
Court-approved rationale for affirmative action under Title VII, which, as
Deborah Malamud has written, was explicitly “aimed at remedying an
imbalance caused by race or gender discrimination in labor markets.”63
Malamud has contrasted this focus to today’s “diversity” rationale, under
which “employers seek to increase the representation of members in
underrepresented groups not with reference to the ‘balance’ that would exist
absent discrimination (measured by some relationship to a relevant labor
market), but rather with reference to one of any number of business goals
their presence is said to serve.”64 The diversity preference cases, of course,
involve another wrinkle: it is not even the employer itself articulating those
goals, but the customer/client/celebrity whom the employer simply wants to
please. Thus, Malamud’s prediction that the Supreme Court is likely to reject
a diversity-based rationale for affirmative action under Title VII65 seems to
apply with even fuller force to this situation.
A final—and very important—reason why employers are unlikely to
be able to successfully invoke the affirmative action doctrine as a defense for
satisfying their clients’ diversity preferences is that the diversity preferences
59. See Rosen, supra note 12.
60. See Rivera, supra note 13.
61. See Kotagel, supra note 8, at ¶1.
62. Id. at ¶4.a.ii.
63. Deborah Malamud, The Strange Persistence of Affirmative Action Under Title VII,
118 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015).
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 9, 21–23.
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are often framed in numerical terms.66 Even in the educational context,
where the Supreme Court has been more open to the diversity rationale for
affirmative action, it has still shunned any use of quotas or hard numerical
targets. That concern dates back to Regents of University of California v.
Bakke,67 and was echoed in the Supreme Court’s split result when it decided
Grutter v. Bollinger68 and Gratz v. Bollinger69 on the same day in June of
2003. There, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s
affirmative action admissions policy in Grutter while rejecting its
undergraduate affirmative action admissions policy in Gratz, in large part
because of Gratz’s more quantitative approach (in attaching 20 points to the
composite admissions score of any applicant from an underrepresented
minority group). Indeed, the Grutter court specifically emphasized that in
establishing affirmative action programs, “universities cannot establish
quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups
on separate admissions tracks.”70
The Supreme Court echoed this concern in Parents Involved v.
Seattle School District 1.71 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for four justices,
stated,
[T]he racial balance the districts seek is a defined range set
solely by reference to the demographics of the respective
school districts. This working backward to achieve a
particular type of racial balance, rather than working
forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity
that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our
existing precedent.72
While Justice Kennedy did not join that portion of the opinion, his
separate concurrence also indicated a rejection of explicit racial targets as
opposed to facially-neutral measures for achieving diversity.73
Indeed, the strength of the Supreme Court’s disfavor toward
numerical targets in achieving diversity is not only problematic for the
affirmative action rationale. It is also quite likely to have a chilling effect on
courts considering an expansion of the “equal burdens” doctrine to this
setting.

66. See Rivera, supra note 13.
67. 438 U.S. 265, 270–71 (1978) (holding the school’s policy of accepting a specified
number of minority students unlawful but still allowing minority status to be taken into
consideration in admission decisions).
68. 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003).
69. 539 U.S. 244, 280 (2003).
70. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
71. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
72. Id. at 729.
73. Id. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The Best Way for Employers to Satisfy the Diversity Preference

Where does that leave us? Are employers who comply with the
diversity preferences expressed by customers, clients, or celebrities simply
waiting to be on the losing end of a Title VII lawsuit? Much will depend on
how they comply. If they satisfy the preference narrowly—for example, by
simply rejiggering a few client teams to meet the numerical targets of the
clients who specifically request a certain percentage of women or minorities,
or by adopting special staffing approaches for crew positions when an A-list
celebrity with an inclusion rider is cast in a movie—then they are indeed at
risk. For the reasons stated above, an employer’s defense that it was simply
satisfying a preference expressed by a customer, client, or celebrity is
unlikely to work here.
On the other hand, if employers take a broader approach, in which
they adopt mechanisms and policies that are designed to promote equal
employment opportunity for all prospective and current employees in
connection with recruiting, hiring, training, and staffing, then they will be on
much safer ground. First, over time this will enable employers to more
naturally satisfy the variously-expressed diversity preferences, since the
employers will have a more diverse workforce. In other words, there will be
less need for active “rejiggering” of client teams to meet particular diversity
goals of specific clients; the client teams should organically become much
more diverse. Second, such policies will limit any individual employee’s
opportunity for a successful Title VII lawsuit, since a threshold requirement
of Title VII is to show some sort of measurable harm.74 If all employees are
truly receiving equal opportunities, a court is less likely to find that a
deprivation in violation of Title VII has occurred.

74. Title VII makes it unlawful both (1) to “discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” and (2) to “limit, segregate, or
classify his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Under the first provision, it must be shown that the employer took a materially adverse
employment action against the employee. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 23, at 146. Under
the second provision, it must be shown that the employer classified employees in a way that
deprived, or at least had the tendency to deprive, a person of employment opportunities. See
id.; see also EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 860 F.3d 564, 567 (7th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the EEOC’s
argument that “any action to limit, segregate, or classify employees because of race
automatically violates” this section, and reasoning that “[i]f it’s not necessary to show that the
challenged employment action ‘deprived’ or tend[ed] to deprive’ the employee of employment
opportunities or ‘otherwise adversely affect[ed] his status as an employee, what is the point of
this statutory language?”).
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CONCLUSION

The confluence of the corporate diversity policies and the inclusion
rider concept is no accident. They are both growing out of a larger frustration
that we still have not achieved true diversity in the workplace (or on the
movie screen) and a desire on the part of powerful corporations and
celebrities to take matters into their own hands and use their power to effect
change. That sentiment is laudable. But it is important for employers to be
proactive—not merely reactive to the diversity preferences expressed by
customers, clients, and celebrities. By proactively developing policies that
promote equal employment opportunity in connection with recruiting, hiring,
training, and staffing, employers will help contribute to better long-term
outcomes and protect themselves from liability under Title VII.

